IKARA and ADASTRA

by Mike Wood

 

An Ikara missile preserved at Australia's Museum of Flight, Nowra.

The Charles F. Adams class destroyer (DDG) HMAS Perth at Brisbane in 1966. (Photo: Ron Cuskelly)

 

Preliminaries:

Adastra was approached by the Royal Australian Navy and the Department of Supply in July 1967 with a request to quote for survey style photography of the Ikara sea trials. Being a prestigious client it was an ideal contract to look to, and we were delighted to win it.

To clarify operational details, including the security angle, Lionel Van Praag and I were invited aboard HMAS Perth to meet the Navy team running the trials. This was on 26th July when the ship was based in Sydney. At that time, 1967, Ikara was in the top secret bracket and security was a concern to them.

The first trial was scheduled for 9th August, and to ease their minds in this latter regard, we nominated as crew, three of our flight personnel who had been commissioned RAAF aircrew, thus having ready clearance. The crew was Lionel, pilot, Vic Petersen on camera and myself as navigator. (Later, after the company's bona fides had been confirmed, security clearances were simplified, although we were still subject to the Official Secrets Act.)

Cdr. Ike Wilson was the RAN director of the trials, and the Department of Supply's representative was Malcolm Barrett. The latter, who retained that role for the duration of the trials, was a most helpful liaison officer, and flew with us, as observer, on several sorties.

First Trial:

On 8th August 1967, we took Hudson VH-AGP down to HMAS Albatross, a shore station at Naval Air Station Nowra, south of Sydney where we had a further briefing and later enjoyed the hospitality of the wardroom. However, this first trial ran into a series of problems, not only with the Ikara launch, but also with ship/aircraft communication, and when bad weather arrived the trial was scrubbed.

Aftermath and Second Trial:

Our debriefing back at Adastra's base at Mascot led to some disquiet. We had flown seven sorties over a four day period and there was concern over the amount of time that one of our survey units had been committed to the work with no result. As it turned out, however, in the long run, this initial trial proved its worth in that liaison became smoother, many of the technical glitches were ironed out, and aborted trials in the years ahead were often due to low cloud or a heavy sea state.

Lionel and I attended the Navy's debrief on 11th August at HMAS Rushcutter, the naval depot. The client also expressed concern, and after a long meeting, decided that more time was needed to solve their own problems.

On 17th November we were again invited to Rushcutter to what was labelled the Sea Trials Conference. Although this was another lengthy affair, greater confidence was evident and a second trial was set down for 13th December.

For the second trial (VH-AGX, same crew) we flew first to the RAN strip at Jervis Bay and picked up as observer, Lt. Taff Hughes. Over three days, we again flew seven sorties, but this time came back with positive photography, both colour and black and white. Our client expressed complete satisfaction with the results and we were assured of an on-going contract for the duration of the trials.

Summary of the Trials:

From that first, aborted attempt in August 1967 to the cessation of the trials in early 1974, Adastra provided survey coverage of the Ikara firings on at least 54 occasions. (This figure was arrived at from my diary entries. There were a few trials during my absence on field work which I didn't record.)

Aircraft Used:

Aircraft	Registration	Trials
Hudson	VH-AGP	1
Hudson	VH-AGX	4
Cessna 206	VH-DGD	8
Cessna 320	VH-DRK	2
Hudson	VH-AGJ	2
DC-3	VH-AGU	10
Aero Commander	VH-AGA	5
Cessna 185	VH-AGE	22

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pilots:

Lionel Van Praag

Roy Williams

Brian Costello

Dave Brennan

Bruce Beale

Ron Pearce

Jock Head

John Messenger

John Collins

Dean Darcey

 

 

 

Miscellany:

Trackers:

On a number of the early trials we were advised by the control ship of a Grumman Tracker operating in the firing zone, but at a safe altitude below us. What we discovered was that the Tracker was also following the missile after launch. This intrigued Lionel and me. But, as it transpired, any suspicions that the Navy boys were setting up their own photographic unit were groundless.

Some years later, in June 1973, the Trackers again appeared in the firing zone. We had been asked to prepare for a new style of two-day trials, one day to involve infra red film for the standard Ikara firing, and day two to cover, with colour film, a torpedo launch from a Tracker. There were six such trials that year. Once again results were mixed, my notes indicating positive outcomes on only five days, the remainder being spoilt by misfirings, rain or heavy sea state.

Cameras:

The camera nominated by the client was the standard Wild RC8 with a 6 inch focal length lens. At one of the RAN debriefings the problem of low cloud and the ensuing reduced photographic coverage was discussed. This prompted me to suggest using the RC9 (focal length 3.5 inches). Perhaps because their plotting set up was based on the 6 inch lens, they were reluctant to switch cameras. Further discussion led to the idea of using the two cameras on the same trial. Of course our only aircraft with dual camera hatches was the DC-3 VH-AGU. The first chance to put the proposal into practice was on 17th February 1970 - one of the sorties described in Peter Shute's account which follows. (The crew was Dave Brennan, pilot, Lionel co-pilot, Peter Shute and John Collins on cameras and myself as navigator.) As it happened, the weather was almost cloudless and the colour imagery from the RC8 gave the client his requirement, with the black and white shorter focal length coverage being of curiosity value only. The experiment was not repeated, even though AGU was often available for subsequent trials.

Near Miss:

Earlier I mentioned technical glitches being ironed out. If this had been 100%, our contract would not have lasted the six or seven years that it did. Indeed, one memorable trial in March 1970 caused a deal of consternation. John Collins and I were in the Cessna 185 VH-AGE, and at launch, with camera rolling, we were just starting to follow the missile when its guidance system went awry. It doubled back on its track and splashed down dangerously close to the launch vessel. There was a sudden deathly silence on the airwaves and we stooged around awaiting instructions. Some time later, a subdued voice announced shut down of the trial and we headed home, but with the evidence of a genuine near miss.

Navy Hospitality:

We were always made welcome in the wardroom when overnighting at Albatross. This was an experience we all enjoyed, but probably more so by the younger members of our crew, who would have been new to the sometimes arcane traditions of an officers' mess. As our operations became routine, preflight briefings were more commonly held in Sydney and we found it expedient to obtain A.T.C. clearance at Mascot and fly directly to the firing zone. Thus, overnights at Albatross became infrequent.

Marker Dye:

Peter Shute's account (which follows) mentions the use of marker dye. My understanding of its purpose was to fix the splashdown point of the missile. Basic photogrammetry would then provide track and distance and confirm the accuracy or otherwise of the firing. On only one occasion of the 50 odd trilas I'd flown on, were we asked to help locate the torpedo, which was designed to surface at the end of its run. I assume it was tracked by a version of Asdic, and its recovery was routine.

Favoured Aircraft:

By far the aircraft which featured most in the Ikara trials was the Cessna 185 VH-AGE. Naturally it was more economical than a Hudson or the DC-3, and it was also the first of our light aircraft to be converted to a two-man operation. (The "Flying Gregorys" in the Aero Commander VH-AGA had been operating as a tandem team before this, but that handsome duo deserve a separate story). To both operate the camera and at the same time navigate the aircraft within prescribed tolerances required a high level of experience. This was especially so over poorly mapped terrain and we found that younger crew members had difficulty with the task. Sadly, the concept of training (except, of course, for pilot conversion) was quite foreign to Adastra's administrative wing. New crews were usually thrown in at the deep end, so to speak, and as a consequence a lot of their work was rejected. This philosophy always irked operational personnel.

 

Mike Wood
6th January 2004